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Koroleva Tatiana Sergeevna
National Research University «Higher School of Economics» (Saint-Petersburg branch)
student of the magister program «Public Administration»

In this article static and dynamic games between the oligarchs and dictators who can contain rent-seeking are modeled. Oligarchs are powerful economic agents who strategically act both in economic, and in political spheres. As economic institutes are imperfect, oligarchs suffer from long search of a rent, and they are interested in creating a situation which can solve their coordinating problem and limit the rent search. However such situation is not always possible.

Keywords: dictatorship, non-democratic politics, oligarchy, property rights

Article reference:
Koroleva T.S. Dictators’ and oligarchs’ game for the property right // Politics, State and Law. 2015. № 7 [Electronic journal]. URL: https://politika.snauka.ru/en/2015/07/3197

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